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THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDWARD DUMBAULD t
In view of the increasing importance of law in international affairs '
and of philosophy in legal studies,2 it becomes of interest to examine the
place of philosophy in international law. Unfortunately, this topic has been
somewhat neglected by modern American jurists. 3 The tendency to "con-
ceive of law as a body of devices for the furtherance of business" ' has led
us to view international law solely as an instrumentality of commerce and
diplomacy.' Yet weighty voices among us sanction a recurrence to the
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I. For recent discussions see SIR JoHN FISCHER WLI AlMs, The Place of Law in Inter-
national Affairs, in CHAaTs ON CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS (1929) c. II, 28-63; Dumbauld, Legal Limitations on War-making (1930) 18 GEO.
L. J. 83; COUDERT (1931) INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 926, 931; Brierly, The Function of
Law in International Relations, in PROBLEMS OF PEACE (3d ser. 1929) 278: LkUTERPACHT,
THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933).
The spread of a violent form of nationalism ("integral" or "totalitarian" nationalism),
extolling the state as the be-all and end-all of human existence and glorifying conquest
abroad as well as tyranny at home, is without doubt inimical to the maintenance of peace and
respect for law and order in the international community. C. D. Burns, Nationalism and
Internationalism, in PROBrImS OF PEACE (2d ser. 1928) 336; HAYES, THE HIsToRIcAl EvO,-
LUTION OF MODERN NATIONAISM (1931) 166; F. L. Schumann, The Political Theory of
German Fascism (1934) 28 Am. POL ScI. REV. 210. But this does not eliminate the role of
international law in regulating the multiplicity of international contacts inescapable under
modern conditions. However fanatically one nation or another may arrogate to itself a mis-
sion to subdue and govern the entire earth in accordance with its particular brand of im-
perialistic or communistic dogma, its dealings with other unconquered nations must remain
subject to international law until that universal dominion is in fact attained, an unlikely con-
summation in view of the large number of competing nationalisms of equal vigor. Unen-
lightened national policies may of course affect the content of substantive international law
and produce a situation requiring reform.
2. Dean Pound and Professors Llewellyn, Morris R. Cohen, and John Dickinson, are
outstanding figures in the group of present-day thinkers who give weight to philosophical
considerations in their legal writings. For a recent statement see K. N. Llewellyn, On Philos-
ophy in American Law (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 205. As an excellent example of the
application of philosophical knowledge to legal problems see FELix S. COHEN, ETHICAL SYS-
TEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS (1933).
3. Thus Professor Whitton rightly speaks of ". the philosophy of international
law, that branch of the droit des gens, which alas, has few amateurs in the United States".
Book Review (1931) 25 Am. J. INT. L. 409, 41o. Dean Pound's paper, Philosophical Theory
and International Law (1923) I BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 72, stands alone as a locus classicus
in our literature. Mention might also be made in this connection of Borchard, Political
Theory and International Law, in MERRIAM AND BARNES, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES
(1924) c. IV, 120.
4. This standpoint is criticised by Pound, The Call for a Realist .urisprudence (i31) 44
HARv. L. REv. 697, 708-9. Compare the complaint of a German scholar, ZITEL.-MANN, DIE
UNVOLLKOMMENHEIT DES V6LKERRECHTS (1919) 14; "Wir haben das V61kerrecht geschicht-
lich und politisch, auch allgemein philosophisch, aber nicht genug juristisch behandelt".
5. John Hanna, The Aims and Methods of Legal Education (1931) 7 Am. L. SCHOOL
REv. 141, 144. Cf. Sir John Fischer Williams, The Legal Character of the Bank for Inter-
natimal Settlements (1930) 24 AM. J. INT. LAW 667; "The work of the experts was, all
through, characterized by a profound and possibly not unjustified mistrust of governments.
In their view, governments had failed to solve the reparation problem; the solution was to
be sought in the action of business men, superior to the passions of the crowd and independent
of rulers who are dependent on the crowd".
(590)
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juristic tradition of ampler vision which animated an age whose achieve-
ments challenge comparison with our own.0 During the formative period
of American law, philosophical elements were not neglected. Not only our
own jurisprudence, but the law of nations as well, was enriched by the
wisdom and learning of Marshall, Jefferson, Wilson, Kent and 8tory.7 It
would therefore seem proper to return to the point where the paths of juris-
prudence and philosophy diverge and from there carry on the philosophical
method.s
What is desired, however, is not a return to the specific "natural law"
doctrines which prevailed in the past and gave to jurists of that day the
philosophical basis for the legal structure which they reared. American
constitutional law affords impressive warnings against such a course. But
reliance upon philosophical method does not necessarily mean reliance upon
the outmoded tenets of any particular philosophical system. "When one
calls for philosophy of law he should demand nothing less than application
to the problems of the legal order of the best and most fruitful ideas and
methods that the philosophical armory of today affords." 9 The duty of
seeking an adequate philosophical foundation is all the greater because of
the fact that even historical and analytical jurists, who profess to repudiate
philosophy, can not in reality escape the inexorable necessity of relying upon
certain philosophical postulates, although they do so blindly and without
reflection.10
6. "One of the valuable results still to be obtained from reading these classic treatises
which helped to form so many great lawyers is the feeling that one brings away that property
law and commercial law are not the whole of the law, but are only parts of a system which
embraces within its scope all the fundamental problems of human and social relations, of a
human organization of society. In so far as we close the shutter to the prospective lawyer
on all but the technical commercial aspects of law, we not merely degrade law from a pro-
fession into a mere means of livelihood, but we also impair the vocational fitness of coming
generations of lawyers to deal with the largest and most important problems which under our
system of government devolve upon the bar." John Dickinson, Legal Education and the Law
School Curriculum (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. Rtv. 424, 435.
7. T. W. Balch, The United States and the Expansion of the Law Between States (1915)
64 U. OF PA. L. REv. 113; J. B. Moore, John Marshall (igol) 16 PoL. Scr. Q. 393; L. M.
Sears, Jefferson and the Law of Nations (1919) 13 Am. Po1 Sci. REv. 379; R. C. Adams,
The Legal Theories of James Wilson (192o) 68 U. OF PA. L. REv. 337; M. 0. Hudson, The
Teaching of International Law in Avtwrica (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 19; C. M. Wiltse, Thomas
Jefferson on the Law of Nations (1935) 29 Ami. J. INT. LAW 66.
8. Pound, supra note 3, at 75. Professor Hudson considers renovation of the philosophi-
cal bases of international law as one of the two major tasks confronting jurists of our
century. The Prospect for International Law in the Twentieth Century (1925) 10 CORN. L.
Q. 419, 423. The need for a new philosophy of international law is likewise voiced by Laski,
The Theory of an International Society, in PRoaI.ms OF PEAcE (6th ser. 1932) 188.
9. PouND, supra note 3, at 75.
IO. Id. at 86; VERDRoSS, DIE VaRASSUNG DER VULKERRECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT (1926)
§ 7. ". . . on ne peut pas faire du droit sans un minimum de philosophie. . . ." Le fur
(France, 1927-111) 18 REcUEIL DES CoUrs (Acad.mie de Droit International de la Haye) 263.
"No juristic effort is possible except as it is based on some philosophy, and the very men who
are most loath to admit this fact are they -who most blandly and blithely indulge their philo-
sophical assumptions. International law has suffered from nothing else as from our un-
willingness to deal with its underlying philosophy in the open." Hudson, supra note 8, at 423,
424.
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Since philosophy of law, therefore, is the application of philosophy to
problems of the legal order, and since international law is the application
of law to problems of international relations," we may expect to find that
every system of philosophy which has left its impress on jurisprudence as
a whole will have corresponding implications for international law. 12 In
view of this parallelism, a scheme of treatment which is familiar to Amer-
ican readers from its use by Dean Pound in his classification of schools of
juristic thought 13 should not be out of place here. We shall therefore pro-
ceed to consider the opinions of authorities on international law with respect
to: (i) the binding force of law; (2) the nature of law; (3) the end of
law.
1 4
I. From What Does International Law Derive Its Binding Force?
Our inquiry is limited to the problem of what makes international law
legally binding. That a moral obligation to obey law also exists, within
limits, one feels instinctively.'3 But the nature and extent of that obliga-
tion is necessarily determined by a rule of morals. Law, as the work of
man, can claim no absolute validity; 16 it is a moral imperative only when
it is so recognized by conscience. 17  The norms Is of law and those of
morals constitute independent realms.19
ii. VERDRoss, op. cit. mupra note IO, at 61; NIEMEYER, V6LKERRECHT (1923)' 10. Cf.
FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION (1931) 582.
12. KuNz, V6LKERRFCITSWISSENSCHAFT UND REINE RECHTSLEHRE (1923) 66, comments
on the tendency to apply every philosophical system to law, ". . . es ffir die Jurisprudenz
zu verwerten". The same author in (1929) 9 ZEiTscHRIFT FOR FFENTLICHES REcHT 473,
points out that Professor Korovin's book there reviewed is an application to international law
of the philosophy of Marx. TELDERS, STAAT EN VOLKENRECHT (1927) makes similar use of
the philosophy of Hegel.
13. See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound (I93I)
44 HARV. L. REv. 1222, for an appreciation of the extent to which Dean Pound's classifications
have been influential in acquainting America with the doctrine of foreign and native jurists.
14. The same classification is followed by RADBRUCH, GRUNDZOGE DER REcHTSPHILOSO-
PHIE (914).
15. WiLLIAms, op. cit. supra note I, at 15.
I6. FE-LCHENFELD, op. cit. supra note II, at 6oi.
17. Until then it is merely external constraint, which may compel obedience but cannot
beget the obligation to obey. LAuN, RECHT UND SrrrucCHcEIT (2d ed. 1927) 15, 16; RAD-
BRUCH, op. cit. supra note 14, at 54; ROUSSEAU, CONTRAT SOCIAL, I, iii.
18. By norms is meant propositions which do not purport to state facts but to set up
standards to which conduct ought to conform. The differentia specifica between law and
other norms presents a controversial problem of jurisprudence not peculiar to international
law. See POUND, LAW AND MORALS (2d ed. 1926); SomL6, JURISTISCE GRUNDLEURE
(1917) ; 3. VAN KAN, INLEIDING TOT DE RECHTSWETETSCHAP (4th ed. 1931) II; MAUSBACH,
NATURRECHT UND V6LKERRECHT (1918) 48, 58, go; RADBRUCH, op. cit. supra note 14, at 39;
VERDROSS, op. cit. supra note Io, at 3, 4; DEL VECCHIO, LA GIUsTIzlA (2d ed. 1924) 46; DE.
VEccmIo, LEzIONi DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTo (1931) 181; TRIEPEL, V6LEERRECHT UND LAN-
DESRECHT (1899) 107-9; SCHOLTEN, BESCHOUWiNGEN OvER RECHT (1924) 35, 203; WILL-
IAMS, op. cit. supra note I, c. I; and the authorities cited in DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES
OF PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES (1932) 8. One might thus summarize the
thought: Law is a norm commanding a certain course of conduct because it is considered as
being just; justice is a virtue unlike courage, temperance, chastity, piety, etc., in that it re-
gards others and confers rights upon them; therefore external constraint is proper, and is
called for by legal norms.
19. Verdross, Zur Konstruktion des V6lkerrechts (Deutschland, 1914) 8 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR V6LIERRECHT 332.
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It is clear, moreover, that legal obligation can flow only from a rule
of law. A given norm can be regarded as legally binding only when a
higher rule of law, of superior authority, has stamped it as such. Thus a
city ordinance has the force of law because a state statute has given it that
effect; the acts of the state legislature in turn are law only because the state's
constitution has vested the legislature with law-making power. Every rule
of law is thus part of a legal system; 20 and every legal, system rests
ultimately upon its "constitution", a fundamental norm from which all
other legal rules derive their validity.2 1 What is the constitution which gives
binding force to the legal system known as international law?
Since it is the constitution of positive international law which we
seek, we must inquire what legal rules are presupposed by observed prac-
tice.2 2  To be scientific, one must systematize all the positive rules of inter-
national law, rather than deny the legal value of everything inconsistent
with a preconceived theory.
2 3
Due weight should then be given to the following points. (i) The
existence, indeed, the importance, of what is known as international law is
not denied by those who, because adhering to a definition of law which is
nothing but a description of municipal law (exclusive of certain parts of
constitutional law) ,24 insist that international law is not law.2 5 (2) The
20. Bruns, V6lkerrecht als Rechtsordming (Deutschland, 1929) I ZEITSCHRIFT F. AUS.
6FF. RT. U. V6LKERRECHT, Teil I, 1O; Perassi, Teoria doiniatica delle Fonte di Norme giuri-
diche in Diritto internazionale (Italia, 1917) II RIV. DI DIR. INT. 216.
21. ANziLoTTI, CORSO (3d ed. 1928) I, 43. In addition to its constitution a legal system
presupposes a community (Rechtsgemeinschaft). Bruns, op. cit. supra note 2o, at Io. There
are also as a rule organs for legislation and enforcement of law. That the legislative func-
tion need not, and cannot to advantage, be exercised by the wielder of physical power is de-
clared by FEILCHENFELD, V6LXERRECHTSPOLITIK ALS WISSENSCHAFT (1922) 172. The same
author in PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSlON (1931) 6oi, observes: "Most writers on inter-
national law fail to distinguish between 'constitutional' and other rules". Among those recog-
nizing the distinction may be named Verdross, Anzilotti, Cavaglieri, Strupp, Balladore-Pal-
lieri, Perassi, Bruns, Kelsen and perhaps Triepel, Politis and Sir John Fischer Williams.
Feilchenfeld's statement that his use of the term "constitution of international law" differs
somewhat from Verdross's "Verfassung der V6lkerrechtsgemeinschaft", in that it "does not
imply that the persons in international law form an organized community", rests upon a mis-
conception of Verdross's'meaning. By "community" Verdross means the conduct in the ex-
ternal world which the law regulates, "den Inbegriff der durch die Rechtsordnung geregelten
Handlungen". VRDRoss, op. cit. supra note IO, at 6. The legal persons recognized by inter-
national law are a community only by reason of their being subject to that law, and are or-
ganized only to the extent to which it prescribes.
22. VEaDRoss, op. cit. supra note IO, at 6;' VFRDROSs, DIE EINHEIT DES RECHTLICHEN
WELTBILDES (1923) 82, 118; Verdross, Grundlagen and Grundlegungen des VTlkerrechts
(Deutschland, 1921) 29 NIEIEYE1S ZEITSCHRIFT FUR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 65, 74.
23. Id. at 81. KELSENI, ALLGE.iEINE STAATSLEHRE (1925) contends that the observer is
free to choose his own hypothetical constitution and to treat as law, and hence material for
legal science, only that part of what claims to be law which conforms to the constitution so
chosen. Thus, he says, it is impossible to refute the standpoint of an anarchist who insists
that law in the capitalist state is nothing but force. VERDRoss, op. cit. supra note IS, at 19,
replies that the anarchist as a scientific observer of facts can not deny that the force in ques-
tion professes to be a norm. Kunz is very insistent that not every hypothesis is a scientific
one. (Belgique, 1925) 52 R. D. I. L. C. 588.
24. JonN BASSETT M0ORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOME CURRENT ILLUSIONS (1924)
292-4.
25. HoLD-FERNEcK, LEHRUCH DES V6LKERRECHTS (1930) I, 78; PHILIP MARSHALL
BROWN, INTERNATIONAL REALITIES (1917) 104.
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technique of international law is a legal technique. "6  (3) The content of
international law, in view of its reception as part of the law of the land, is
important for the lawyer in his practice. (4) The relation of international
law to topics admittedly legal is so close, that to be properly understood they
must be studied together.
It is quite correct, therefore, to insist upon the teaching of inter-
national law in law schools as a legal, rather than political, science.
27 If
possible, without disregarding facts or unduly widening our definition of
law, our legal system as constructed by philosophical theory should harmonize
with practical requirements by including international law.2 S  We now pro-
ceed to examine various constructions which have been advanced.
A. Systems Based on Supernational Natural Law.
Of venerable antiquity, coeval with our international law itself, is the
view which bases its binding force upon natural law. This doctrine treats
international law and internal law as identical in character, but in resting
both upon a basis of ethical and political speculation does not appeal to the
modern jurist.29 The Spanish jurist-theologians made international law
26. The contrast between canon law on the one hand and Christian ethics or the consid-
erations affecting the selection of an ecclesiastical functionary-on the other illustrates the
distinctiveness of a legal technique. Cf. JoHN DICKINSON, A WORKING THEORY OF SOVER-
EIGNTY (1928) 24.
27. Hudson, supra note 7, at 23; POTTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNMENT (3d ed. 1928) ix. It is of course true that a certain knowledge of international
law is required by intelligent laymen for the proper performance of their civic duties. But
the same is true of constitutional and commercial law, and the knowledge in question is quite
different from that needed by a practicing lawyer. See EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERN-
MENT (1932) V.
The separate and distinct sciences which take as their respective provinces law, politics,
ethics, economics, history, etc., do not lose their identity and essential distinguishing charac-
teristics by reason of the mere fact that the social phenomena subjected to their scrutiny hap-
pen to be phenomena of international life. (It is possible to group the pertinent subdivisions
of the several different sciences which touch upon international life into a composite science
of international affairs as a whole, designated in German by the term Internationallehre. See
H. KRAUS, GEDANKEN 0BER STAATSETHOS IM INTERNATIONALEN VERKEHR (1925) 71.) It
is therefore undesirable to adopt a conception of law which results in classifying international
law as morality or politics.
28. So Schoen, Zur Lehre von den Grundlagen des V61kerrechts (Deutschland, 1915) 8
ARcHIV F. RECHTS- U. WIRTSCHAFTSPHILOSOPHIE 292, urges that the same foundation for
the validity of international law as for other law should be established. For there can be only
one definition of law for the jurist. International law, if it is law at all, has the same essen-
tial characteristics (wesensgleich) as private law or criminal law (as to which see W,-zEL,
JURISTIscHE GRUNDPROBLEME (1920) 357, 358, 397, 398). But it is important to observe that
it is not necessary that international law resemble other branches of law in all respects, but
only in those which are essential to the idea of law. AxzxoTTi, CORSO DI DIRITTO INTER-
NAZIONALE (1912) I, 32. As will be seen later, Schoen in trying to bring international law
within a too narrow definition of "law" has overlooked features which differentiate it from
internal law and has thereby subjected himself to the criticism of Hold-Ferneck, op. cit.
supra note 25, at 8o, 86. io5, 112. Cf. also TRIEPEL, op. cit. supra note I8, at 9; DIcKINSON,
op. cit. supra note 26. at 23.
29. BERGBOHM, JURISPRUDENZ UND RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (1892) 526: "Recht is nur das
positive Recht, und positives Recht nur was in einem geschichtlichen Vorginge zu Recht ge-
worden ist, und d:e geschichtlichen Vorginge . . . das sind die Rechtsbildungsformen oder
sog. formellen Quellen des Rechts". On positivism see Kxrnz, op. cit. supra note 12, at 5;
Verdross, Grundlagen (supra note 22), at 81; STRUPP, GRUNDZ0GE DES PosTIvEN V6LKER-
RECHTS (4th ed. 1928) 13.
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possible by deducing from reason or divine will rules binding the sovereign
in his relations with other sovereigns, as well as those applicable to his rela-
tions with his own subjects and to their relations with each other.30 This
fashion of treating together international law, constitutional law and
political theory was carried over into the works of Protestant jurist-
theologians and subsequent writers. "The law-of-nature theory held on
longer in international law than elsewhere. International lawyers had a
sound instinct that creative thought was needed in a field of law where
maturity was still far in the future; they had a subconscious feeling that
any creative theory was better than the merely organizing and logically
critical theories of nineteenth-century legal science. Yet the jurists of the
last century were right in their judgment that the classical law-of-nature
philosophy could serve them no longer . . . English and Americans were
right in demanding a better theory of international obligation. But they
were wrong in believing that they could find it without the aid of philosophy.
On the whole the Continental speculative writers were nearer the truth.
Their error was in relying upon a philosophical system, the philosophy of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, rather than upon philosophy." 31
This type of natural law with a definite content, as recently revived by
Catholic writers,3 2 makes eternal rules of right and wrong the basis for
state conduct.3 3  At the same time a type of formal natural law with a
changing content has developed, postulating that law must be just, must
correspond to the nature of things.34  Justice is eternal and immutable, but
that which is just varies from time to time and from place to place.35 An
intermediate view recognizes two specific rules: a state (i) must do no
wrong to another (without compensation), and (2) must keep its prom-
ises. 36
30. Pound, The End of Law as Developed in "Juristic Thought (1914) 27 HARV. L. REV.
605, 615, 616.
31. Pound, supra note 3, at 83, 84.
32. CATHREIN, DiE GRUNDLAGEN DES VOLKERRECHTS (1918) ; MAUSBACH, NATURRECHT
UND V6LKERRECHT (I918).
33. "Nun gibt es viele Handlungen, die ihrer Natur nach ein geordnetes, gedeihliches Zu-
sammenleben unm6glich machen. Dazu geh6rt Mord, Diebstahl, Ehebruch, falsche Zeugnis,
Vaterlandsverrat u. dgl. Wenn in einer Gesellschaft diese Handlungen allgemein als gut und
lobenswert angesehen wirden, miisste sie in kfirzester Zeit zugrunde gehen. . . . Jeder
will sich selbst in dem was er sein nennen kann; in seinem Leben, seiner Freiheit, seiner Frau,
seinem Eigentum usw., erhalten wissen und darin nicht ungerecht geschddigt werden".
CATHREIN, op. cit. supra note 32, at 20, 48. So in international relations the rights of individ-
uals must be respected regardless of their espousal by recognized states. Id. at 61. "Die Staats-
vertriige verpflichten iihnlich wie die Privat vertraige, weil es eine Forderung der natiirlichen
Gerechtigkeit ist, dass man rechtmassig eingegangene Vertrfge balte. Der Grundsatz: Du
sollst die Vertriige halten (pacta sunt servanda) ist eine notwendige und naheliegende
Schlussfolgerung aus den beiden uns von selbst einleuchtenden Grundsdtze, Man soll jedem
das Seine geben und keinem ein Unrecht zufiigen." Id. at 70.
34. NELSON, DiE REcHTSWISSENSCHAFT OHNE REcHT (917) 215; von Bar, Grundlage
i. Kodifikation des Va7lkerrechts (Deutschland, 1912) 6 ARCHIV F. REcHTS- U. WIaTSCHArTS-
PHILOSOPHIE 153; KOHLER, LEHRBUCH DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (2d ed. 1917) 52.
35. ARISTOTLE, NICOMCHFAN ETHics V, i0; Verdross, Le Fondement du Droit Inter-
national (France, I927-I) 16 RECUEIL DES Couas (Academie de Droit International) 251, 284.
36. Le Fur, La Thgorie di Droit Naturel (France, 1927-II) 18 RECUEIL DES CoUs 261,
at 389. A supplementary principle is that of respect for authority. Id. at 39o.
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B. Systems Based on the Authority of a Single State
Writers belonging to the law of nature school conceived of law as a
norm emanating from an authority superior to its subjects; and they re-
garded it as self-evident that such norms existed for both individuals and
states. When jurists began to call for a positive, man-made, historical law,
they did not discard the natural-law conception of law as the norm of a
superior authority, but found in the rules imposed by a state upon its sub-
jects a law which met both tests. It was not difficult to take the next step
and assert that nothing could be positive law which was not the product of
state will.
3 7
From that standpoint, the rules commonly called international law,
which do not even profess to be the creation of any single sovereign, are
plainly not law. International law, where the subjects are states, is obvi-
ously a logical impossibility when it is required of law that it must come
from the state as well as come from a source superior to its subjects. 38
More moderate is the view of Hold-Ferneck, who concedes that a state
may be bound by rules to which it has consented and which are consistent
with its self-preservation." He admits the existence and importance of
international law, but denies its legal character by reason of its failure to
provide order, security and peace, the three elements entering into his
definition of law.
40
Similar in substance is the theory of Eric Kaufnaim, who declares
that victorious war is the social ideal, and that the limits of international
obligation are set by the self-interest of the state. He is able to conclude in
favor of the legal nature of international law, however, by reason of his
view that law need not necessarily imply subordination to a higher authority,
but may be a law of co-ordination between equals.41
37. Cf. WENZEL, op. cit. supra note 28, at 425. Unless the state is defined as being the
law-producing agency, one must say that positive law is that which is produced by the sources
of law, rather than that which is produced by the state; otherwise it is a natural-law assump-
tion on the "constitutional" plane. For a legal system could have other sources than the state
(which has been the case historically) if by "state" is meant a sociological conception such as
the highly developed administrative machines of our time. SoasL6, op. cit. supra note 18, at
253, 270; Verdross, supra note 19, at 357; Perassi, supra note 20, at 223; Balladore-Pallieri,
La forza obbligatoria della consuetudine internazionale (Italia, 1928) 2o Riv. DI DiR. INT.
338, 367, 372, 373; Del Vecchio, Sulla statualitd del diritto (Italia, 1929) 9 Riv. INT. DI FnLos
.EL DIR.
38. LASSON, PRINCIP UND ZUKUNFT DES VOLKERRECHTS (1871) 22. Chief among the
"V lkerrechtsleugner", Lasson considers legal relations impossible among sovereign states,
whose inevitable condition is that of hostility. The same thought recurs emphatically in
IHOLD-FERNECK, op. cit. supra note 25, at ii. Cf. BURCKELARDT, DIE UNVOLLICOMMENHEIT DES
V6LKERRECHTS (1923) 3. For criticism of Lasson, see BERGBOHM, STAATSVERTR GE t'ND GE-
SETZE ALS QUEILEN DES V6LKERRECHTS (1876) ; and WAL.Z, WESEN DES V6&KERmCHTS aND
KRITIK DER V6LKERRECHTSLFUGNER (1930).
39. HOLD-FERNECK, op. cit. supra note 25, at 123, 186.
40. Id. at 78; ANERKENNTNG UND SELBSTBILDUNG 66; DER STAAT ALS tYBERMENSCH
(1926) 8, 58. See also Bruns, supra note 20, at 9; RADBRUCH, op. cit. supra note 14, at 178.
41. KAUFMANN, DAS WESEN DES VOLKERRECHTS UND DIE CLAUSULA REBUS SiC STAN-
TIBUS (1911) 153, 166, 199, 204.
PHILOSOPHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Another group of jurists sought to establish the legal nature of inter-
national law by putting it upon the same basis as internal law. This necessi-
tated sacrificing the traditional conception of law, as well as the peculiar
characteristics of international law. International law, thus degraded, be-
comes "dusseres Staatsrecht", that part of internal law which deals with
foreign affairs.
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Jellinek, an outstanding adherent of the "auto-limitation theory", seeks
to avoid this criticism by the argument that the objective nature of the
facts governed by international law logically necessitates the acceptance of
identical rules by all states, so that the international law which each state
binds itself to observe is not the result of mere chance or accident.43
Schoen 44 likewise insists that international law is not mere "dusseres
Staatsrecht" but is law of a higher order, by reason of the fact that it is
mutually binding and based on the common consent of states; for each
state exacts acceptance by 'others as the condition of its own assent. Most
ingenious in this respect is a theory formerly advanced by Verdross 4' to
show why a state cannot by its own act liberate itself from the obligation
of treaties, and how the whole system of international law is based on the
state constitution in the same way as internal legislation. 40  He points out
that every state constitution. provides that the head of the state may negotiate
treaties. Since these provisions may be interpreted as contemplating the
conclusion of treaties, but not their breach, the state remains bound as long
as its constitution is in force; 47 for, just as the constitution may require
the assent of both houses of Parliament to repeal statutes, so it may require
the assent of both co-contractants to repeal the obligation of a treaty.
Verdross admits that Merkl's criticism of this theory as not adequately
accounting for customary law is justified. For even if treaties need not be
in writing, the actual constitutional provisions in force do have reference
42. A. ZORN, GRUNDZOGE DES V6LKERRECHTS (2d ed. 1903) 7: "V6lkerrecht ist juristisch
Recht nur, wenn und soweit es Staatsrecht ist". WENZEL, op. cit. supra note 28, at 403: "Das
V6lkerrecht gilt aus dem Staat, fdr den Staat und gegen den Staat. Es gilt mit derselben
Autorltit, wie das fibrige aus dem Staat geltende Recht. Kiirzer gesagt: V5lkerrecht is
staatliches Recht". JELLINEK, ALLGEmEINE STAATSLEHRE (3d ed. 1920) 479: "Dies ist der
einzig m~gliche Weg, das V6lkerrecht rechtlich zu begrfinden. . . . Alle Versuche, die
Geltung des V5lkerrechts auf eine fiber den Staaten stehende Rechtsquelle zur~ickzufiihren
sind misslungen und werden misslingen". Cf. Schoen, supra note 28.
43. DI E RECHTLICHE NATUR DER STAATENVERTRXGE (1880) 47, 49. If there were not an
identical law, the validity of treaties, as a legally binding "consensus" ad idemn", could not be
made out.
44. Supra note 28, at 305, 306. Accord: WENZEL, op. cit. supra note 28, at 409.
45. Supra note i9. at 338, 342.
46. Id. at 339-353.
47. Id. at 340, 347, 355, 357. But the constitution is subject to amendment. IVENZEL, op.
cit. supra note 28, at 5o5-5o9, is logical in holding that a state may modify its own interna-
tional law, but may violate that of another state, which will protest. Schoen apparently be-
lieves that since common consent is necessary for the existence of international law, it ceases
with the cessation of such common consent. Op. cit. supra note 28, at 31o. By the collective
will theory a rule once established remains law until changed in the same manner. The "con-
stitutional" theory also requires change in a duly authorized way. Perassi, supra note 2o, at
294.
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to such written instruments, and not to "tacit pacts" establishing interna-
tional custom. One might rely upon the fact that many treaties incorporate
by reference international law as a whole, including custom, but it is doubt-
ful whether such an explanation would account for all existing international
law.
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Moreover, it must be admitted that any theory, however ingenious,
which bases international law upon the authority of a single state is open
to certain fundamental objections.
(i) A state bound only by its own will is really not bound at all. It
may change its will at any time. 49  Even if the state constitution surrounds
its international legislation with extraordinary formalities and guarantees,
the state remains free, legally speaking, to nullify its international obliga-
tions at any time by taking the trouble to amend its constitution. But
nothing is clearer as a matter of positive international law than that a state's
international obligations are independent of domestic legislation, including
constitutional provisions.5 0
(2) Consequently under this theory there could logically be no inter-
national responsibility for violations of international law,5 ' at least if a
state took the precaution to declare that it no longer considered a rule as
binding before violating it.5 2
(3) Nor could there ever be a controversy as to the existence or non-
existence of a particular rule of international law. By the very fact that it
was disputed the rule would cease to exist.-
3
(4) Even if a state could bind itself and thus confer rights upon other
independent states,54 it could not impose obligations upon them.5
(5) There could only be one state sovereign; -5 but the right of all
states to independent co-existence is one of the fundamental presuppositions
of international law.5
7
48. Verdross, Grundlagen (supra note 22), at 70.
49. Even if earlier declarations of will prevailed over subsequent ones, the two wills
would be distinct, like Philip drunk and Philip sober, and there would be no true "Selbst-
bindung". RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (3d ed. 1932) 181.
50. Verdross, supra note 35, at 269; HOLD-FERNECK, supra note 25, at 115; ANZILOTTI,
CoRso (3d ed. 1928) I, 422.
5i. STRT3PP, DAS VoLKERREcHTLIcHE DELiKT (1920) 4.
52. MAUSBACH, op. cit. supra note 32, at 122, refers to the unfortunate effects of the Ger-
man Chancellor's admission that the invasion of Belgium was a violation of law.
53. Perassi, supra note 2o, at 218.
54. Such a possibility seems no more difficult than the creation of rights in internal law
for the benefit of other persons than the state itself. Schoen, supra note 28, at 3o4; JE.LINEK,
RECHTLICHE NATUR (1880) 47.
55. ANZILOTTI, TEORIA GENERALE DELLA RESPONSIBILITA DELLO STATO (0902) 31; MAUS-
BACH, op. cit. supra note 32, at ioo; Schoen, supra note 28, at 307.
56. KiELSEN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 123; RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (3d ed. 1932)
195; BURNS, THE MORALITY OF NATIONS (I916) 48.
57. LASSON, op. cit. upra note 38, at 12; LiszT, V6LKERRECHT (ioth ed. 1915) 65;
Dumbauld, Toward a Self-Governing World (0929) 40 INT. J. ETHIcs 92; I FAUCHILLE,
TRAITt DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1922) premimre partie, IO, ii; TRIEPET, op. cit.
supra note 18, at 20.
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(6) In truth it is impossible to meet the objection that the theory
makes international law an "dusseres Staatsrecht"; it would involve a
multiplicity of systems of international law.58 But the unity and universality
of international law is one of its distinguishing features.5 9
(7) At least one rule of law is presupposed, that which gives binding
force to the declared will of the state and determines what acts of human
beings are to be regarded as declarative of that will.
60
(8) No international obligation could survive a revolutionary change
in the state constitution; yet state succession and its attendant obligations
form an important chapter of international law. 61
It thus appears that theories based upon the authority of a single state,
however palatable they may be to nationalistic sentiment, 62 are scientifically
inadequate, as not explaining all the observed phenomena of positive inter-
national law.
C. Systems Based on Supernational Authority
Like the theories which have just been considered, those which seek
a basis for international law which is superior to the authority of a single
state may be divided into three groups, according to whether they take as
such a basis might, state will, or a fundamental legal norm. The first
alternative is represented by Soml6, who finds in international law, as in
internal law, a relation of subordination to the norms of a superior might.6 3
But since it does not correspond to his definition of law,6 4 Soml6 erects
international law as a separate and independent system of norms 6'5 co-
ordinate with legal, conventional and moral norms.66
The second alternative is followed by what is perhaps the prevailing
orthodox doctrine, which insists that the will of one state is insufficient as
a basis for international law; and looks instead to the collective will of
states.6 7  Hence, having different sources, as well as different provinces,
58. WEN EL, op. cit. supra note 28, at 387: "Die V6lkerrechtsnormen haben also so viele
Geltungsgriinde als Staaten".
59. Verdross, supra note 35, at 252; Scott, L'Universalitj du Droit des Gens (1927)
i R. D. I. 637.
6o. Verdross, supra note 35, at 266.
6I. Id. at 269; Verdross, Grundlagen (szpra note 22), at 8o. This reason led Verdross to
abandon his former construction. On state succession see the works of Huber and Feilchen-
feld.
62. See supra note i.
63. JuIsTIscHE GRUNDLEHRE (1917) 155.
64. As "the norms of a habitually obeyed, omnicompetent, permanent highest might".
Id. at 1O5. Such a might is termed "Rechtsmacht". It may be subject to a higher might
(as the international might which produces international law) but not to a higher
"Rechtsmacht"; for then the latter and not the former would be "Rechtsmacht". Id. at 167.
The other three elements are also found missing in international law. Id. at 159, 162, 163.
"65. To be termed "international or super-state norms".
66. Op. cit. supra note 63, at 170.
67. Tsmp, I, op. cit. supra note 18, at 32.
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international law and the law of the land are distinct legal systems. 68 This
view is therefore called the dualistic construction.
Collective will in the sense here spoken of is not a mere aggregate of
concurring wills, as in the jus gentiumn of Schoen, Wenzel and Verdross
previously discussed. If the will of one state is insufficient to create inter-
national law, the sum of such wills is equally incapable of doing so.6" It is
like the collective will of Rousseau, a volonti ggngrale as distinguished' from
the volontg de tous.70
But how is this collective will formed? What makes it binding? Pre-
existing rules of law must be presupposed for that purpose."' Triepel
acknowledges that the validity of the ultimate norm in a legal system can
not be explained juridically. He advances as an ethical justification for the
binding force of the collective will the fact that each state finds in the col-
lective will not only the will of others but its own will as well.7 2  In this
fashion, the kinship of this theory with the social contract philosophy, a
fact which has not escaped notice, 3 is clearly shown. It is a form of
natural law on the "constitutional" plane.
68. Id. at 9; see Pound, Common Law and Legislation (i9o8) 21 HARv. L. REV. 383, 395.
69. MAUSBACH, op. cit. supra note 32, at io4; HE LBORN, GRUNDBEGRIFFE DES V6LKER-
RECHTS (912) 36.
70. CONTRAT SOCIAL, II, iii; ANznIoTrrI, CORSO (1st ed. 1912) 47. Yet Anzilotti says
(24, 25) that the state can not be bound without the concurrence of its own will; neverthe-
less its own will alone is not sufficient to create international law. JELLINEK, op. cit. supra
note 42, at 48o, says there are two alternatives. Either the will of each state remains
separate in the mixture, and then one is back to the point where the auto-limitation theory
begins, and must show how the state can bind itself; or else a new will emerges, and it
becomes necessary to show a "bearer" for such will, in the shape of a super-state or civitas
maxima. Impressed by the untenableness of the latter view, and considering the auto-
limitation theory a logical monstrosity, Strupp abandoned the collective will theory in favor
of that resting the binding force of the declared will of states upon the fundamental norm
pacta sunt servanda.
Krabbe, Kelsen and Verdross have pointed out that a rule of law is presupposed in
order to ascertain what acts of human beings are to be considered as expressing the "will
of the state". Yet if one insists on defining law as the will of the state, there must be an
international "state" before an international law can exist. If so, it seems clear that such a
state differs from what are ordinarily called states in that its commands do not cover as
comprehensive a sphere of conduct, but are confined to regulating international relations
(HoLD-FERNECK, op. cit. supra note 25, at 88; SOML6, op. cit. supra note 18 at i59;
FILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra note ii, at 582), and in that it would have no fellows. Sir J. F.
Williams, Book Review (931) 45 HARV. L. REv. 225, 227.
One might conclude that no international law is possible, for it would be either
"dusseres Staatsrecht" of individual states on the one hand or "inneres Staatsrecht" of a
super-state on the other. Yet we have seen (supra note 57) that the coexistence of inde-
pendent states is one of the distinctive features of our problem. The autonomy of states
constitutes the antinomy of international law. See Conclusion, infra. Cf. DEL VsccxiO,
LFzioNi, supra note i8, at 273; ANzILOTTI, CORSO (3d ed. 1928) I, 45.
71. Verdross, supra note 35, at 277; ANzInoTrrI, CORSO (3d ed. 1928) 43; WILLIAMS,
op. cit. supra note I, at 17; PoLiTis, THE NEW AsPEcTs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928) 5.
72. TRiEPEL, op. cit. skpra note 18, at 82. ANzinorrI, CORSO (1st ed. 1912) 27 regards
the collective will as binding because it is in fact accepted as such by states.
73. Hudson, supra note 8, at 429; KOHLER, GRUNDLAGEN DES V6LKERRECE[TS (1918) 7;
RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (3d ed. 1932) 193; CAVAGLIERI, LA CONSUETUDINE
GIURIDICA (I9o7) 68, 71.
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We have now seen that to explain why international law is legally
binding, it is necessary to refer to its fundamental legal norm, or constitu-
tion. What is the content of that basic norm?
Anzilotti declares that the fundamental norm of the international legal
system is pacta sunt servanda.74 Verdross has shown that that principle is
more than positive law for the practitioner; it appeals to the philosopher of
law as well, because it is an expression of objective justice, having root in
the realm of ethical values. 75 The constitution includes the rule pacta sunt
servanda,7 but may include others in addition. 7 In fact that rule alone is
not enough. 78 Verdross recently formulated the content of the basic norm
as a command that, subject to observance of more precise provisions estab-
lished by treaty and custom, sovereign communities should govern their
mutual conduct in accordance with "general principles of law". 9
Postulation of the legal order is the important thing. Once the basic
utterance fiat lex, whether induced by moral or material necessity, has given
life to a juridical structure and indicated how its growth is to be governed,
the jurist may pursue his task in confidence.
II. The Nature of International Law
Most of the matter that would appropriately fall under this heading
has already emerged during the foregoing discussion of the binding force
of international law; for it is by comparison of his notions regarding the
nature of law with those regarding the nature of international law that
74. CORSO (3d ed. 1928) 43. (So too Strupp, op. cit. supra note 29, at 5, who also
formerly adhered to the collective will theory.) Hence any jus inter potestates whose
rules derive their binding force from a fundamental norm pacta sunt servanda is part of
international law. ANZILOTTI, CoRso (3d ed. 1928) 119, 129, 131; VERDRoss, op. cit. supra
note io, at 116-117.
75. Fondement (supra note 35), at 286; VERFASSUNG (supra note I0), at 31.
76. ErNHEIT (supra note 22), at 1o6. The fundamental principle of good faith ("Treu
und Glauben") for which Hold-Ferneck (op. cit. supra note 25, at 200, 2Ol) contends is
practically equivalent to pacta sunt servanda. It is perhaps preferable in that it does not
suggest a limitation to treaty obligations, but would obviously include both of Le Fur's
rules of natural law. Radbruch, in his RECHTSPHILOSOPHiE (3d ed. 1932) 82, regards as
the fundamental norm of all positive law the precept enjoining obedience to the powers that
be. ROMANS, 13, I.
77. EiNHEIT (supra note 22), at 59; WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note I, at 17.
78. Grundlagen (supra note 22), at 84. Sir John Fischer Williams (193I) Treaty Re-
vision and the Future of the League of Nations, 10 INT. AFF. 328, declares: "I do not
accept the idea that the one and only fundamental doctrine of international law is pacta sunt
servanda'. Customary law must be included. Balladore-Pallieri, op. cit. supra note 37, at
342, 369. Besides the concept of the state in international law [cf. FEILCHENFELD, 602;
ANziLoTIT, CoRso (3d ed. 1928) I, 51, 1151, provision must be made for the modification of
law and the imposition of obligations upon states not actually contracting. Grundlagen, 89.
Bruns, supra note 20, at 28-29 is emphatic to the effect that pacta sunt vervanda does not
explain why states are bound against their will.
79. Verdross, Die allgeineinen Rcchtsgrundsiitzce als Vdlkerrechtsqnelle, in GESELL-
SCHAFT, STAAT UxID RECHT (FEsTSCHRIrr FOR KELSEN) (1931) 354, 362: "Die v~iker-
rechtliche Grundnorm wiirde also etwa folgenden Inhalt haben: Souverdine und teilsouveriine
Rechtsgemeinschaften, verhaltet Euch in Eueren gegenseitigen Beziehungen nach den
allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsiitzen, soweit sich nicht im internationalen Verkehre besondere,
von jenen Grundsitzen abweichende, gilltige Normen herausgebildet haben". As to "general
principles of law", see infra, "The Nature of International Law".
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
every jurist must determine whether, in his judgment, the complex of
norms known as international law possesses binding force as law. Only one
or two minor points of interest remain to be mentioned here.
Modern legal science recognizes that law is made up of more than
imperative, specific precepts. In addition to express enactments of legis-
lative character and historically demonstrable customs, there is an ideal
element embodying traditional conceptions of justice and modes of legal
thought.s0 Some writers on international law designate this element as
"international equity law", or include it under the rubric of customary
law."' Following the language of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, Verdross and subsequent writers adopt the preferable
usage of understanding by customary law only those rules which are based
upon actual tacit consent of states,8 2 and utilizing the expression "general
principles of law" 83 to denote that residual part of positive international
law which does not originate from veritable consent of states.8
4
Another valuable contribution of Verdross in respect of the nature
of international law is his exposition of the character of sovereignty. A
distinction is drawn between two senses in which the term "sovereignty"
may be used. Sovereignty in the sense of being the highest legal authority
belongs only to the law, the fundamental norm. State sovereignty is inde-
pendence of a superior, in the sense in which Bodin spoke of the sovereign,
who, although bound by the laws of God and nature (hence by the inter-
national law of that epoch), had no suzerain over him. 5
8o. DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROVMSIES
(1932) § 76, and authorities there cited. See also Pound, Book Review (933) 46 HARV. L.
REv. 864, 868.
Si. Id. at 175.
82. VERDROSS, VEF~uASSUNG (supra note I0) 57. Agreement implied in fact, rather
than implied in law, to use common law terminology. A view prevalent since Grotius
(VERFASSUNG 54) regards custom as a "tacit pact", hence as an expression of common
consent of states just as much as an express treaty. Cf. CAVAGLIERI, op. cit. supra note 73,
at 72. But much of what is called customary law really does not involve actual, conscious
consent, an act of will. Balladore-Pallieri, supra note 37, at 342; GIANNI, LA COUTUME EN
DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1931) 119, 159. With the realization that the binding force of
international law does not rest upon the consent of states, but upon the basic norm, the
fiction of tacit consent may be abandoned. Verdross, supra note 79, at 359. The funda-
mental norm clothes "general principles of law" with binding force directly, just as it
recognizes treaty and custom as sources of law. Id. at 362. According to Balladore-
Pallieri, I "Principi Generali del Diritto Riconosciuti dalle Nasoni Cizili" nell' Art, 38 ..LLo
STATUTO DELLA CORTE PERMANENTE DI GIuSTIZIA INTERNAZIONALE (1931) 64, resort to"general principles of law" is sanctioned by a rule of customary law. Cf. VEuRnoss,
VERFASSUNG 59.
83. The principles of law in question must reflect a substantially unanimous conviction
with respect to weighty presuppositions of civilized international life. Hirle, Die allgentemen
Rechtsgrundsiitze im V6lkerrecht (Deutschland, 1931) 11 ZT. F. OFF. RT. 234; BALLADORE-
PALLIERI, Principi, supra note 82, at 73; Verdross, supra note 79, at 364. For examples of
such principles see DUMBAULD, op. cit. supra 178, and Verdross, Die Qucellen des Viilker-
rechts (Deutschland, 193o) IO MIrrEILUNGEN. DER DEUTSCHEN GEsELLSCHAFT FUR V6LER-
RECHT 81, 8g.
84. ANZILOTI, CoRso (3d ed. 1928) I, 64, still regards custom as a tacit pact [Cf.
CoRso (st ed. 1912) I, 52]. But is not that opinion a case of the false positivism criticised
in CORSO (3rd ed. 1928) I, 113? See also notes lO3 and io8 infra.
85. VERnRoss, DIE EINHEIT DES RECHTLICIIEN WELTBILDrES (1923) I. Abschnitt.
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A state's sovereignty is thus a legal sphere of action conferred by
international law. States are endowed with constitutional autonomy, and
possess sovereignty by reason of their direct dependence from international
law, without the intervention of any intermediate legal order.86 As organs
of international law, charged with the task of executing its provisions, they
are assigned certain provinces of exclusive jurisdiction, as well as certain
definite obligations.87  Other spheres (such as jurisdiction over the high
seas) are entrusted to all states equally,88 or to groups of states,89 or directly
to international organs, such as the Saar commission."
III. The End of Law
According to Dean Pound,91 a study of legal history reveals various
conceptions of the end of law in different epochs. (i) In primitive law,
the paramount purpose was to preserve peace by appeasing the wronged
party's desire for vengeance. This was accomplished by a tariff of com-
positions, which the state as time went on compelled the wrongdoer to pay
and the victim to accept. The amount of compensation did not depend so
much on the gravity of the offense, measured by an objective standard, as
upon the intensity of resentment aroused and the degree of violence to
which it was likely to lead. (2) In the period of strict law, the object was
to maintain the social status quo. Rigid formalism characterized the re-
quirements for setting in motion legal remedies and rights of action. Form
rather than substance was stressed. (3) An infusion of ethical elements
entered the law during the era of equity and natural law. This epoch was
marked by an excessive, because ineffectual, desire to accomplish ethical
ends and achieve true justice. Emphasis was upon duties rather than
rights. (4) Then came the maturity of law, strictly separating law from
morals and laying weight upon abstract legal rights, especially property
and contract, with a view to assuring the maximum of individual self-
assertion under a general law of freedom. Security of acquisitions and
security of transactions were watchwords of this period. (5) Enfin vint
Malherbe. Recent years have seen the growth of a conception of juris-
prudence as social engineering seeking to reconcile conflicting claims so
far as possible and to protect interests rather than rights as such. Social
justice rather than legal justice is sought.
9 2
A survey of international law will reveal that all of these elements
may be found present at the same time side by side. Diplomatic protection
86. VERDRoss, op. cit. supra note io, at 115.
87. Id. at 75-76.
88. Id. at 45. -
89. Id. at 211 et seq.
go. Id. at 77 et seq.
91. The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines (194) 27 Hv. L.
REv. I95, ig8 et seq.
9z Social Justice and Legal Justice (1912) 75 CENT. L. J. 455.
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of nationals abroad and state responsibility for injury to -foreigners ex-
hibit a survival of the solidarity between members of the same tribe or clan
which characterized primitive law. The redress afforded is similar to
wergild. And it is not unthinkable that a weak state, to appease the wrath
of a powerful neighbor, may make ampler retribution than would be the
case if the situation of the parties were reversed.93
So too international law presents the spectacle of strict insistence on
the letter of engagements and rigid formalism with respect to rights of
action. Resort to international tribunals is not accepted as the normal
method of settling controversies, and narrow legalistic objections to jurisdic-
tion are raised.94 States espousing the claims of their nationals in order
that proceedings may be instituted in international courts remind one of
the familiar John Doe in actions of ejectment. 95 An opinion is also
noticeable which attaches great weight to preservation of 'the territorial,
economic and political status quo established at the end of the world war. 96
As we have seen already, natural law doctrines are again springing up.
The rights of man and married women enjoy particular favor in present
day discussion.97
Self-assertion and clinging to abstract legal rights can find no better
illustration than that afforded by the dominant doctrine of state sovereignty
in international law.9 Yet a growing mass of social and humanitarian
legislation in the international field shows that the world is awake to the
necessity of protecting social interests by means of legal machinery.
Sociological jurists are calling for immediate application of their methods
to the problems of international law.99 Here too "the time has gone by
when law is only an unconscious embodiment of the general will. It has
become a conscious reaction upon itself of organized society seeking to
determine its own destinies." 100
The coexistence of these various elements gives reason to hope that
international law may be spared the necessity of successively passing
through every stage of development through which private law has passed
93. Borchard, Theoretical Aspects of the International Responsibility of States (Deutsch-
land, I929) i ZEITSCHRIFT F. AUS. OFF. R'r. U. V6LKERRECHT, I Teil, 247, 249.
94. Bruns, supra note 20, at 35.
95. Case concerning Serbian loans, Publications of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, series A, no. 20/21 (1929).
96. This delusion is no new one. "Imperial Rome, unlike sacred Troy, was to be
eternal; the Holy Roman Empire was to be the heir of that eternity. The Treaties of
Westphalia, of Utrecht, of Vienna, of Berlin, none of them so far as I know, made provision
for change or included any clause of revision. And nevertheless the pontifex and the silent
virgin no longer climb the Capitol, and the Holy Alliance is as impotent as the royal
tenants of the Abbey of St. Denis." Williams, supra note 78, at 327.
97. See ScoTT, LE PR0GRkS DU DROT DES GENs (1930).
98. See Brierly, The Shortcomings of International Law (1924) BRiTasH YEARBoo00
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4, 12.
99. Pound, supra note 3, at 89; Hudson, supra note 8, at 435.
i0. HoLMEs, CoLuECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 129, 130.
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in the course of history.101 Every advance in jurisprudence must be
promptly turned to account in the development of international law.
Conclusion
Philosophy should play in international law much the same r6le as in
other legal systems. Its chief concern is with the problems which are at
the bottom of the legal structure. It tells us what law is, and what it is
for.10 2  Yet philosophy is not without its part in developing specific rules
of law, as it liberates juristic processes from bondage to fixed ideas and
cramping concepts. By undermining ancient error and distinguishing sub-
stance from shadow it exorcises many a fearsome phantom.10 3
With respect to the foundations of international law, we have seen
that the problem consists in reconciling as neatly as possible the following
propositions: (i) Law is a binding norm laid down by a superior authority;
(2) A state can not be bound except by its own will; (3) International law
is not the product of the will of any single state; (4) International law is
law, binding every state.
Legal antinomies are not unlike the other antinomies of philosophy.
That a person can not obligate himself; that nothing outside himself can
obligate him; and that obligation exists presents a situation resembling the
philosophical problem of epistemology: the knower and known are separate
and transcendant, yet knowledge of the object by the subject is a phenomenon
whose existence is clear.'" 4 Philosophy should teach the lawyer to avoid
making practical problems out of intellectual difficulties, but instead to
utilize theoretical achievements for the clarification of practice; for practice
is the theory of those who are in positions of authority.
To summarize the results of our survey:
(i) International law is international; it is not the internal law of a
super-state or of a multitude of states, a composite structure like "criminal
law" or "contracts", a conglomeration of rules prevailing in many juris-
dictions with respect to a common subject-matter. It is a universal unity,
1O. Thus Professor Hudson voices the hope that international government may be
saved from certain dogmas which have been dominant in political theory. Book Review
(193) 44 HARv. L. REV. 1311.
io2. It is important to avoid the reproach of Bacon: "Philosophers make imaginary
laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as the stars, which give little
light because they are so high". Quoted in HIGGINS, STUDIES I., INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND RELATIONS (1928) 5.
1O3. Thus Niemeyer, in EINSTWEILIGE VERFeGU X(GAN DES WFELTGERICHTSHOFS, 1R
WESEN UND IHRE GRENZEN (1932) occasionally understates the positive law as to judicial
remedies pendente lite because of a philosophical conviction that there are immanent or
inherent limitations on international jurisdiction arising out of the nature of international
law. The truth is that states may agree to settle any dispute by any method. Sir John
Fischer Williams, Justiciable and Other Disputes (1932) 26 A-Mf. J. INT. L. 31, 34; SCOTT,
SOVEREIGN STATES AND SUITS (1925) 147. The question of justiciability therefore must
always be determined by scrutiny of positive law.
io4. A good treatment of the problem of knowledge is contained in NlcoLAi HARTMANN,
GRUNDZOGE EINER METAPHYSIK DER ERKENNTNIS (2d cd. 1925).
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having its own constitution and community, made up of independent states.
(2) That the fundamental norm is binding must be shown upon moral
or political extra-legal grounds.'0 5 Here may be considered the facts of
international intercourse, the pressure of commercial needs and humanitarian
desires.'0 6
(3) What the content of the fundamental norm is must be ascertained
by observation. It includes the rule pacta sunt servanda.107
(4) The fundamental norm prescribes how law is to be made. Sources
so referred to are convention, custom and general principles of law.' 08
(5) International law sets the orbit within which states may exercise
their jurisdiction.10 9 The doctrine that the jurisdiction of states is not
unlimited, embracing the whole world, but has definite boundaries is one
of the chief contributions of Anglo-American legal thought to the science
of international law."
0
(6) International law is not the source of state law and power, but a
limitation on it; just as states in the American union derive authority from
their own constitutions but are curbed by the federal Constitution."' If the
monistic construction bringing international law and the internal law of
every state within the same legal system is to be preserved, it must be on
the basis of common dependence upon a higher norm."
2
I05. ANzILoTTI, CORSO (3rd ed. 1928) 42; Verdross, spra note I9, at 355; TRIpEr,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 82.
io6. NELSON, op. cit. supra note 34, at 95; Le Fur, Le Droit Naturel ou Objectif, s'gtend-
il aux Rapports Internationaux? (Belgique 1925) 52 R. D. I. L. C. 59, 61; JELLINEX,
RECTLICHE NATUR (880) 48, 49; Schoen, supra note 28, at 303; FAUCHILLE, op. Cit.
supra note 57; Perassi, supra note 20, at 214, 222; STRUPP, GRUNDZ0GE (1928) I.
1o7. That rule exists also as a norm of ethics, and as such is an element under (2) to
show why international law is a social necessity. SOa1L6, op. cit. supra note 18, at 172;
Perassi, upra note 2o, at 212.
io8. Therefore one must scrutinize the sources rather than look for actual consent by
particular states. To indulge in speculations about "sovereignty" when seeking to ascertain
the existence and extent of a rule of international law is as out of place as similar discussion
of "freedom" and the "rights of man" in a suit for collection of a debt. Bruns, supra note
20, at 33, 35. States become bound by international law "not by any act of their own,
express or implied" but "just in the same way as an individual is bound by municipal law-
that is to say, as an inevitable result of birth into a society ruled by that law". WILLIAMS,
op. cit. supra note i, at 14. Once the existence of an international legal order is established,
whether by consent of states or the exigencies of nature or any other way, nothing but the
"coustitutional" rules of the legal system may be looked to for the purpose of ascertaining
the content of the law in force in the community.
1O9. Cf. KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 121.
no. Leo Gross, Der Rechtsbegriff des Common Law und das V6lkerrecht (Deutsch-
land, 1931) II ZEIrSCHRirr FUR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 366.
iii. ANZlLOTri, CORSO (3rd ed. 1928) 49.
112. VERDROSs, DiE VOLKERRECHTSWIDRIDGE KRIEGSHANDLUNG UND DER STRAFANSPRUCH
DER STAATEN (920) 41, n. 75, mentions this possibility but regards it as of no practical
importance. Cf. KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 23, at i99, 20O, for analogous treatment of the
relation between federal and local law.
